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1 PARTICIPATORY EVALUATION OF EARTHQUAKE RISK AND RESILIENCE 
IN ADDIS ABABA 
 
Addis Ababa is the capital and the largest city of Ethiopia. It is home to 25% of the urban population in 
the country. This city is urbanizing and growing in an accelerated way, and it is considered the growth 
engine for Ethiopia (WB & GFDRR, 2015). Ethiopia is one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, 
(IFRCRCS, 2013) but is affected by droughts, floods, landslides, epidemics, pests, earthquakes and forest 
fires (ISDR & WB, 2009), due to its geographical characteristics. These events could hinder the 
achievement of the development goals of the country, and usually, impact the poor more severely due 
to pre-existing vulnerabilities. The economy of Addis Ababa is growing annually by 14%, and it 
contributes approximately 50% towards the national GDP. Although the strong economic growth trends 
of the city, Addis Ababa faces unemployment, high poverty levels, and problems to access basic services 
(WB & GFDRR, 2015), factors that, among others, affect the community’s resilience to extreme natural 
events.  
 
The East African Rift System, where Ethiopia is located, is the most seismically active region of Sub 
Saharan Africa and damaging earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 6.0M have been recorded in 
this region (Midzi & Manzunzu, 2014). Cities have been expanding and growing over the years within 
Africa, and this growth has been mainly attributed to urbanisation and the need for rural people to seek 
a better quality of life in larger cities. Seismic risk, in turn, is aggravated by the presence of highly 
vulnerable buildings and structures which are being constructed without taking into consideration the 
potential for ground shaking. The result is that even moderate sized events occurring near to a highly 
populated city with many vulnerable buildings have the potential to cause devastating damage to 
buildings resulting in great economic losses coupled with the severe loss of human lives. 
 
Addis Ababa is located 75-100 km away from the western edge of the main Ethiopian Rift Valley (WB & 
GFDRR, 2015). Given a scenario where an earthquake’s epicentre is located at least 27km from the city, 
15% of the buildings are likely to suffer collapse resulting in a high number of fatalities (UNISDR, 1999). 
On the 10th September 2016, a Mw 5.9 earthquake struck the northwest part of Tanzania near the 
western shores of Lake Victoria causing approximately 200 injuries. Destruction was not confined to 
Tanzania alone, but spread across the Northern border to neighbouring Uganda were several buildings 
collapsed. The earthquake was also felt in Rwanda and Kenya. While these events might not cause large 
economic losses compared to those recorded for more developed countries, the population in the 
region has been increasing over the past decades resulting in higher human losses.  
 
 It is expected that Addis Ababa doubles its population by 2030 and turns into a megacity of almost ten 
million people by 2037. The rate of growth puts pressure on the housing sector, mainly in the lowest 
income segments. Poor quality housing built in chika (wood and mud mixture) represents nearly 70-80% 
of the housing stock. This kind of houses includes informal housing and government-owned housing 
known locally as kebele housing, which was built and extended informally before and while under 
government ownership (WB & GFDRR, 2015). Construction methods for buildings have also evolved 
with time from traditional wood and mud structures with straw roofs. This kind of structures have a 
larger inherent resistance to ground shaking due to them being lighter in weight and more ductile, to 
more modern architecture of unreinforced masonry, which is heavier and more rigid making them more 
vulnerable to earthquake shaking. There is a high concentration of poor quality housing in peri-urban 
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areas, and some city neighbourhoods are comprised of low-quality settlements. Informal and 
government-owned are usually overcrowded, constructed of inadequate materials, and located in 
relatively higher-risk areas like river banks. Under these circumstances, the impact of a plausible 
earthquake in Addis Ababa could be devastating (WB & GFDRR, 2015). 
 
To measure, communicate and ultimately reduce earthquake risk, more needs to be undertaken besides 
hazard analysis and loss estimation for risk assessments. One way of taking it a step further is the 
development of disaster resilient communities by governments, researchers and stakeholders to 
enhance the capacity of those communities to recover from earthquake impacts within the shortest 
possible time. Resilience, for the purposes of this report is defined as “the ability of a system, 
community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the 
effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, through the preservation and restoration of its 
essential basic structures and functions” (UNISDR 2009). It is becoming increasingly clear that the ability 
to measure resilience is a key step towards disaster risk reduction. While numerous communities have 
sought to explain the determinants of disaster resilience, differences in perceptions among the 
community on natural hazards, however, have been barely reported (Hajito, Gesesew, Bayu, & Tsehay, 
(2015).  
 
 The ten essentials for making cities resilient are (Molin, Rego, Scott, & Valdés, 2012):  
 
• Essential 1: Institutional and administrative framework 
• Essential 2: Financing and resources 
• Essential 3: Multi-hazard risk assessment- know your risk 
• Essential 4: Infrastructure protection, upgrading, and resilience  
• Essential 5: Protect vital facilities: education and health 
• Essential 6: Building regulations and land use planning 
• Essential 7: Training, education and public awareness 
• Essential 8: Environmental protection and strengthening of ecosystems 
• Essential 9: Effective preparedness, early warning, and response 
• Essential 10: Recovery and rebuilding communities 
 
Overall, building resilient communities involves proper planning to avoid the generation of new risk and 
mitigation measures to reduce the existing risk and its long-term impact. For this to happen, active 
participation of all sectors of society, from the authorities to the public, is required.  
1.1 Objectives 
An essential step to understand and enhance the resilience of cities to earthquakes is to measure the 
concept. Measurement is vital not only to evaluate and benchmark the baseline conditions of what 
makes communities resilient but also to help communities to understand the factors that lead to losses 
and the differential ability of populations across and within communities to recover when damaging 
events occur. To address this, GEM and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
collaborated to facilitate the Resilience Performance Scorecard (RPS) workshop in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. The RPS is a multi-level and multi-scale self-evaluation tool that empowers stakeholders to 
assess earthquake resilience parameters based primarily on qualitative information. Here, an interactive 
voting system is used in a workshop setting to identify priorities where activities may be pertinent for 
earthquake risk reduction or where existing initiatives may be improved to increase earthquake 
resilience in different sectors of society. Six dimensions of earthquake resilience are encompassed to 
address key areas that mainstream risk reduction namely; planning and decision-making processes, 
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social capacity, awareness and advocacy, legal and institutional arrangements, planning and regulation, 
critical infrastructure and services, and emergency preparedness and response.  
 
The purpose of the RPS is to provide a tool that can capture the key functional and organizational areas 
of opportunity for urban resilience enhancement with local government officials and community leaders 
as the targeted decision-making body. The implementation of the Scorecard in Addis Ababa required 
engagement with local stakeholders for the design of the indicators (questions) and targets (answer 
schemes) of the Scorecard. It was anticipated that the Scorecard approach would provide a “broad 
brush” assessment to enable local policy makers and communities to establish priorities for more in-
depth analysis, to allocate funds, and to develop emergency and disaster management programs more 
effectively.  
 
The RPS was adjusted to the context of a Sub-Saharan African city and administered for the Addis Ababa 
Metropolitan area in a workshop that spanned two days (June 28 – 29, 2016). The workshop was held 
with two different groups of participants: 1) sub-city representatives from Addis Ababa and 2) 
municipal, federal and NGO representatives from different departments concerned with Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management within the city. Each group was surveyed with the help of a local facilitator. 
The facilitator ensured that all questions were adequately understood, misinterpretation was 
minimized, and discussions were steered and targeted. 
 
The use of the RPS was intended to help stakeholders (city official and community representatives) to 
identify the degree to which they would be able to build their resilience by identifying gaps and 
opportunities for resilience enhancement (UNISDR, 2012a). Thereby giving them a means to: 
 
• foresee and/or acknowledge threats and risks;  
• better understand and identify key gaps in earthquake resilience at the community and institutional 
level within their city;  
• facilitate discussion between community leaders, stakeholders, and officials regarding their seismic 
risk and resilience;  
• work with emergency services and other agencies on earthquake risk reduction; 
• create an agenda to foster the development of detailed risk and resilience assessments based on 
the identified gaps that could lead to the construction or update of resilience management 
strategies;  
• create benchmarks for monitoring and evaluating resilience and earthquake risk reduction;  
• have a sense-of-community and social capital and 
• Take collective responsibility to reduce the impacts of damaging earthquake events. 
 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Sub-section 1.2 presents the study area and its 
exposure to earthquake events. Section 2 provides the methodology used for the analysis of resilience. 
Section 3 delineates the results obtained for each question using the scorecard approach, Section 4 
presents an analysis of the results by the dimensional driver of resilience, and Section 5 presents 
activities and projects that could be of interest to reduce risk and improve the earthquake resilience of 
Addis Ababa. 
1.2 The Metropolitan City of Addis Ababa 
Addis Ababa is the capital city of Ethiopia. The city is in the region of Oromia highlands bordering the 
Great Rift Valley and is the country’s commercial and cultural hub. In 2016, the population of Addis 
Ababa was approximated as being 3.6 million. Addis Ababa has the status of both a city and a state, and 
the city is divided into ten boroughs called sub-cities. The city has recently been in a construction boom 
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with many high-rise structures being built all over the city. The location of the city could be appreciated 
in Figure 1.   
 
 
Figure 1 Location of Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). 
a) Location of Ethiopia in the world, b) Location of Addis Ababa in Ethiopia and c)Sub-cities in 
Addis Ababa.  
 
1.2.1 Seismic risk of Addis Ababa 
 
Damaging earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 6 occur almost annually in the East African Rift. To 
date, five earthquakes measuring 7M and above have occurred in eastern Africa since 1900 (Kebede & 
Kulhanek, 1991). The level of seismic activity in Ethiopia is considered moderate. The most recent 
earthquake event in Ethiopia occurred on 16 January 2016, which had a magnitude of 4.5 at a depth of 
10 km. This earthquake struck the city of Hawassa, located in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and 
People's Region. It is reported to have resulted in about 150 people being injured. Seismic events of 
moderate magnitudes have occurred near to Addis Ababa. The distribution of events from the 
homogenised earthquake catalogue of the Sub-Saharan Africa Seismic Hazard Project carried out by 
GEM in partnership with Africa Array, and USAID is depicted in Figure 2. Individual countries have their 
own models but are yet to be homogenised together to cover the African continent. The use of this 
regional model in this instance helps to view more holistically, which events near or outside of Addis 
Ababa and Ethiopia may have a potential threat to the capital city. 
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Figure 2 Distribution of events from the homogenised SSA earthquake catalogue. 
Source: Poggi, V., Durrheim, R., Mavonga, T. G., Weatherill, G., Pagani, M., Nyblade, A., & Delvaux, D. (2016). 
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2 METHODOLOGY 
2.1 The Resilience Performance Scorecard (RPS) 
 
In line with the "building resilience in nations and communities” goal of the Hyogo Framework for 
Action HFA (now the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction), the RPS was developed in 
collaboration with local stakeholders and experts on disaster risk reduction. The main aim was to 
address resiliency of key dimensions within a city’s communities and its government’s functional and 
operational activities. Six dimensions that mainstream risk reduction into planning and decision-making 
processes at the local level were identified: 
 
1. Awareness and Advocacy. It represents the level of awareness and knowledge of earthquake risk 
within communities and among communities leaders and public institutions. 
 
2. Social Capacity. It is related to the capacities of the population to prepare, respond and recover from 
a damaging earthquake. 
 
3. Legal and institutional arrangements. It corresponds to the mechanisms available to advocate 
earthquake risk reduction in the city. 
 
4. Planning, regulation and mainstreaming risk mitigation. It is related to the commitment and 
mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction through regulatory planning tools in the city. 
 
5. Emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. It reflects the effectiveness and performance of 
the risk management system of the city of response and recovery in case of emergencies. 
 
6. Critical services and public infrastructure resilience: that correspond to the capacity of lifelines and 
critical facilities to react and respond during and after earthquake events. 
 
These six key areas of the RPS are closely aligned with the UNISDR’s 10 Essentials of a Resilient City 
(UNISDR, 2012b). The Scorecard’s main aim is to track progress on the mainstreaming of risk reduction 
approaches in a city’s organizational, functional, operational and development systems and processes. It 
also seeks to address issues to do with urban resilience and does so at multiple levels of geography or 
administration divisions. The urban resilience goals are divided into three strategic goals as shown in the 
chart Figure 3. Each of the strategic goals corresponds to one or more likely key dimensions analysed in 
the Scorecard where these goals are to be implemented. The connection between the six key 
dimensions to one or more of the ten Essentials is depicted in Figure 3. Furthermore, several questions 
that were developed for the Scorecard correspond to each of the six key areas of urban resilience. 
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Figure 3 Key dimensions and essentials of urban resilience.  
Adapted from Anhorn, J., Burton, C., & B. Khazai (2014) 
 
 
While the key dimensions of the scorecard are consistent across different scales, some indicators 
(questions) and targets (answer schemes) along each of the themes within the six dimensions were 
adjusted to represent the appropriate scale. For example, to ensure relevance to the local context, 
targets (answer scheme) and indicators (scorecard questions) for measuring urban resilience for each of 
the six key areas were adjusted to represent the proper scale of analysis. These adjustments were based 
on in-depth interviews with various stakeholders such as academia, urban planners and urban planning 
associations, community development associations, city and local officials, national and international 
NGOs and relief and response organizations.   
 
It was within this context that the initial scorecard for Addis Ababa City was done collaboratively with 
the Addis Ababa City officials, community leaders, and other stakeholders to understand potential gaps 
in resilience, in which measures could be put in place to fill those gaps, and identify critical areas where 
further analysis would be needed. 
 
2.2 Structure of the Scorecard 
The purpose of the development and application of the RPS is to provide a tool that can capture the key 
functional and organizational areas for urban resilience with communities and local government officials 
as the targeted decision-making body (UNISDR, 2014). In this regard, the structure of the Scorecard was 
developed considering the dimensions listed in the sections above. Moreover, each dimension was 
divided into a set of indicators (questions). Specific questions of the scorecard can be adjusted for the 
local context of the area being analysed. It is within this context that the dimensions, indicators and 
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brief explanations of them are detailed in Table 1 to provide a guideline for the development of a 
scorecard to represent the needs of the city being analysed.   
 The indicators considered for each dimension and their rationale are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1 Rationale of the indices adopted for resilience assessment Valcarcel et al. 2016. 
Indicators Rationale 
Dimension: awareness and advocacy 
Level of awareness and 
knowledge of earthquake 
risk 
Inform population may demand the development of risk mitigation projects and may 
participate in emergency response activities.  
Information about 
earthquake safety, 
preparedness, and risk 
reduction. 
Adequate channels and mechanisms of communication facilitate the dissemination of 
relevant information for risk identification, mitigation, and emergency response.  
Public outreach activities 
informing about disaster 
safety, preparedness and 
risk reduction 
Meetings, presentations, and events regarding earthquake risk allow stakeholders to 
disseminate relevant information for vulnerability reduction and emergency 
response. Also, such meetings are useful to raise awareness and create community 
groups working for their seismic safety. 
Training and capacity 
building programs to 
increase technical and 
professional resources for 
earthquake risk reduction 
Trained persons will demand and lead the development of risk mitigation activities 
within their communities. 
Dimension: social capacity* 
Healthcare and social 
assistance programs 
available for vulnerable 
groups 
Healthcare providers, including physicians, nursing homes, and hospitals, are 
important post-event sources of relief.  
Ties and connections 
between people 
A community with strong ties is more likely to create organisations and working- 
groups for risk reduction and emergency response, or to depend on each other for 
earthquake response activities and recovery. 
Social integration 
considering different 
economic levels 
The socioeconomic status of communities determines the ability to absorb losses and 
enhance resilience from hazard impacts. Wealth enables communities to absorb and 
recover from losses more quickly due to insurance and social safety nets. Those 
people who are dependent on social services for survival are already economically 
and socially marginalised and require additional support in the post-disaster period. 
Social integration of 
minority populations 
Race and ethnicity impose language and cultural barriers that affect access to post-
disaster funding and residential locations in high hazard areas. 
Access to electricity gas 
and clean water 
The lack of access to sewers, water, gas, infrastructure represents a condition of 
vulnerability and marginalization.  
Primary education 
Education is linked to socioeconomic status, with higher educational attainment 
resulting in greater lifetime earnings. Lower education constrains the ability to 
understand warning information and access to recovery information lower education 
constrains the ability to understand warning information and access to recovery 
information. 
Interaction between 
formal and informal 
institutions 
Strong interactions between formal (governmental) and informal institutions could 
facilitate the development of risk mitigation projects and emergency response plans 
that include citizen participation. 
Participation in decision 
making 
Formal mechanisms of participation of community leaders in decision making allow 
the incorporation of community needs in programs for disaster risk management. 
Protection of historic 
buildings and cultural 
heritage 
The protection of cultural values and heritage is a key aspect to preserve the identity 
of communities.  
Dimension: legal and institutional arrangements 
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Indicators Rationale 
Regulations, ordinances, or incentives 
for earthquake safety and risk 
reduction 
Legal instruments such as regulations and ordinances usually establish 
responsibilities, duties, plans, concepts, strategies and priorities. Therefore, 
such instruments facilitate the coordination between public institutions, 
communities and the private sector regarding the development of risk 
mitigation projects and emergency response activities.  
Community leaders with roles and 
responsibilities for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 
Formal mechanisms of participation of community leaders in decision making 
allow the incorporation of community needs in programs for disaster risk 
management. 
Mechanisms of coordination and 
cooperation for disaster preparedness, 
safety and risk reduction 
Confidence in the central and local 
government and non-governmental 
institutions to prepare for, respond and 
recover from a damaging earthquake 
Confidence in the government facilitates the use of public resources and the 
participation of communities in the development of risk management 
programs. 
Dimension: planning, regulation and mainstreaming risk reduction 
Earthquake resistant building 
construction codes 
Building codes and their implementation reduces the construction of 
structures highly vulnerable to earthquake events. 
Reinforcement and retrofitting of 
private infrastructure 
The retrofitting of private infrastructure mitigates the physical vulnerability of 
(residential, commercial) buildings, reducing potential damages and losses in 
case of events. 
Availability and use of earthquake 
insurance 
The use of insurance regarding earthquake risk favours the availability of 
economic resources for recovery and reconstruction activities. 
Availability of funding for disaster risk 
management plans or earthquake 
mitigation programs 
The availability of financial resources facilitates the development of risk 
identification and mitigation programs. 
Dimension: emergency preparedness, response, and recovery 
Population storing goods to be used in 
case of disasters 
Population storing goods will have access to resources required to guarantee 
minimal conditions of living in emergency situations. Such population will not 
depend entirely on the aid and support from the community, the government 
and public institutions. 
Local centres for implementing and 
coordinating emergency response and 
management 
Centres with adequate resources for emergency coordination facilitates the 
decision-making process during crises, providing a common space for the 
communication and the interaction between different actors (public, private 
institutions, and communities) as well as the access to essential services for 
people participating in the management of emergencies. 
Standard operational procedures for 
coordinating emergency rescue and 
response activities 
In the case of emergency, protocols and procedures for emergency response 
are used to define the required participants and resources as well as their 
roles and responsibilities. 
Funds for emergency preparedness, 
response and recovery operations 
The availability of funds for emergency response facilitates a prompt 
assistance to the affected population, as well as the repair and reconstruction 
of infrastructure damaged.  
Human resources for emergency 
preparedness, response and recovery 
operations 
The availability of human resources and equipment favours a prompt and 
effective response in case of emergency. 
Equipment for emergency rescue, 
response, and clean-up operations 
Response plan for post-earthquake 
emergency operations 
Plans for post-earthquake emergency operations are useful to define 
responsibilities and resources required for a prompt and effective response. 
Dimension: critical services and public infrastructure resilience 
Assessment, reinforcement, and retrofitting 
of critical public infrastructure  
Facilities such as schools, hospitals, and critical infrastructure such 
as lifelines provide important services to communities in normal 
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Indicators Rationale 
Structural improvements to reduce seismic 
risk in lifelines 
conditions as well as in the case of emergencies. Therefore, the 
reduction of the structural and non-structural vulnerabilities of 
such buildings and infrastructure could be promoted to guarantee 
their operation and functionality during and after earthquake 
events. 
Business continuity plan of local government 
offices for the aftermath of a damaging 
earthquake 
Business continuity plans are used to guarantee the operation and 
functionality of governmental offices after emergencies and 
earthquake events. 
Plans for the repair or replacement of critical 
lifelines in the aftermath of a damaging 
earthquake event 
The implementation of plans for recovery and reconstruction of 
lifelines facilities a prompt restoration of the services affected, by 
defining responsibilities, functionality targets and financial 
resources required. 
Adapted from Cutter et al. (2003). 
2.3 Scoring system 
For each indicator (questions), a set of targets (answer schemes) were established in to understand gaps 
in earthquake resilience in a city’s communities and its organizational, functional and operational 
systems and processes. In this sense, the implementation of the Scorecard requires engagement into a 
preparatory process where the local context is identified for the design of the indicators (questions) and 
targets (answer schemes) of the Scorecard. The targets were initially defined by using four main 
categories  (Khazai et al., 2015)(Anhorn et al. 2014): 
 
1-Almost none. “Little or no awareness” This level represents little or no awareness, understanding, and 
mainstreaming of disaster risk within a community or a city. There is no institutional policy or process 
for incorporating risk reduction within the functions and operations of the city or its communities. 
Additionally, in some cases, there is an adverse attitude and adverse institutional culture towards 
adopting measures to reduce risk. Thus, significant resistance is expected from any risk reduction 
initiative potentially resulting in greater vulnerability and higher losses in the future. 
 
2-Low. “Awareness of needs” This level refers to an early stage of awareness. The city or community has 
a growing level of awareness, and there is support for disaster reduction among the policy makers. The 
city and its communities may have activities, and dedicated efforts for preparedness but these are 
simply limited to response. Support is limited and does not necessarily carry through at all levels of the 
local government; resistance to change is expected at various levels where “business as usual” is judged 
sufficient. In general, the city/communities have no established policy, guidelines or system for 
mainstreaming, and action will be needed at the highest level to establish such policies and systems. 
This level is expected not to result in risk reduction in the long term. Vulnerability to earthquakes under 
these circumstances may increase. 
 
3-Moderate. “Engagement and Commitment”. This third category refers to a high level of engagement 
and commitment to Disaster Risk Reduction (DDR) by the institutions involved. However, the policies 
and systems have not been fully established yet. The city/community may not have a deep 
understanding of the mainstreaming process and requirements, and there may still be limited capacity 
to increase resilience, but overall there is a willingness to take some action; commitment for change, 
and to shift from response only to mainstreaming DRR. There may be “pockets of resistance,” to 
mitigation and DRR planning but these are expected to be overcome with time. 
 
4-High. “Full integration” This level refers to a situation where risk reduction and resilience is fully 
absorbed into planning and development processes as well as core services. The city/community places 
high importance on reducing disaster risks in a sustainable program of action at multiple levels and 
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within multiple sectors, and there is a comprehensive demonstration of practice. This level describes a 
situation where disaster risk reduction is “institutionalized”. However, this is not to suggest that an 
optimum level of attainment has occurred: there is still a need for further progress. The process of 
mainstreaming should be viewed as open-ended: while organizations should aim to achieve this level, 
they should also aim to make continuous improvements to their approach. 
 
Within these levels, graduated variations of the following topics were also considered:  
 
• The level of implementation of risk reduction, emergency response and recovery plans.  
• People are participating in disaster risk management programs. 
• Availability of mechanisms of information, coordination, and communication. 
• The frequency of and participation in risk management activities. 
• Coverage of risk management programs, lifelines, and critical services. 
• Availability of resources for risk mitigation, emergency response, and recovery. 
 
For the sake of simplicity, numerical values (1 to 4) were assigned to each category. A score for each 
question (Sub City/ local authority) was calculated by using linear max-min normalization and the 
average results obtained by the correspondent participants as described in Equation. 1 
 
 
Eq.1 
 
Where SIi,j is the score of the index i and dimension j; max corresponds to the maximum score (4), min 
corresponds to the minimum score (1) and avg corresponds to the average of the participants’ results. A 
score for each dimension was obtained as the average of the scores obtained for the corresponding 
indicators. By using such a normalized scale, results close to 0 represent a very low resilience (almost 
none), and values close to 1 represent a high resilience.  
 
In this way, the aim was to collaboratively develop and implement an initial scorecard that can guide the 
city of Addis Ababa and other stakeholders in understanding potential gaps in resilience, in which 
strategies can be put in place to fill those gaps, and research can be applied to critical areas where 
further analysis is needed. 
 
2.4 Workshop setting and participants 
The workshop spanned two days from June 28th - 29th 2016. The workshop was held with two different 
groups of participants concerned with Disaster Risk Reduction and Management within the city: 28 
community representatives from each of Addis Ababa’s 10 Sub-Cities and 21 Municipal and Federal 
representatives from different departments. The questions were translated into the local language of 
the people. Specifically, Amharic and examples from Addis Ababa were used. Each group were surveyed 
with the help of a local facilitator. The facilitator ensured that all questions were adequately 
understood, misinterpretation was minimized and discussions were steered and targeted. Answers were 
transferred from each participant using remote controllers to a base station. Thus, all participants 
transmitted their answers in time and completeness was ensured. The images of the RPS workshop in 
Addis Ababa are presented in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 Resilience Performance Scorecard Workshop Participants. 
 
Two sessions were utilized to capture the scores of each group independently, and a final session of 
discussion and comparison of results was conducted. It was anticipated that the scorecard approach 
would enable local policy makers and communities to establish priorities for more in-depth analysis, to 
allocate funds, and to develop emergency and disaster management programs more effectively. The use 
of the scorecard helped to identify the degree to which communities build their resilience because they 
can identify gaps and opportunities for resilience enhancement. The latter allowed communities to: 1) 
foresee and/or acknowledge threats and risks; 2) work with emergency services and other agencies on 
earthquake risk reduction; 3) have a sense of community and social capital; and 4) take collective 
responsibility to reduce the impacts of disruptive events and disasters. 
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3 EVALUATION OF EARTHQUAKE RESILIENCE IN ADDIS ABABA 
 
3.1 Awareness and Advocacy 
The objective of this theme is to identify the level of awareness and knowledge of earthquake risk in 
community leaders and public officials. This theme encompasses the perception of the population 
regarding earthquake risk, the information available regarding earthquake safety and the development 
of training to increase abilities to identify and respond in case of earthquakes. Perception towards 
disasters depends on being a victim or not, gender, ethnicity, spatial location, magnitude, the degree of 
the hazard (extent, level, and duration) and the capacity of the community (Aboagye, Dari, & Koomson, 
2016). In Jimma, the largest city in south-western Ethiopia, 22.5% (n=309) of the sampling population of 
the study carried out by Hajito et al.(2015) reported to have experienced an earthquake. 
3.1.1 Level of awareness and knowledge of earthquake risk 
 
The scoring for both community leaders and governmental officials regarding the level of awareness and 
knowledge of earthquake risk in Addis Ababa is presented in Figure 5. It is interesting to see the 
significant difference in the results. While government officials consider that more than one-third of the 
population have high or moderate levels of risk awareness, community leaders express that almost 90% 
of the population have very low or non-existent level of risk awareness. Overall, the results show clearly 
the need to increase risk education among the city’s population. 
 
Question: How many people in your sub-city/city are concerned about an earthquake causing damage 
that will impact their life and property? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Almost all Many A few None 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 5 Level of awareness and knowledge of earthquake risk. 
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These results for Addis Ababa are in sharp contrast with levels of awareness regarding other hazards 
(floods, droughts, disease outbreaks and car accidents) measured in Jimma, which according to  Hajito 
et al. (2015) are about 85%. Even the relatively high levels of awareness observed in Jimma may not be 
enough to result in tangible actions. According to the Red Cross, some of their respondents in Jimma still 
consider disasters as “God’s punishment.”  Although awareness does not always lead to action; it is a 
precursor for desired actions, such as high level of disaster preparedness and better coping ability (UN, 
2008).  
 
Although several studies have demonstrated that older people, due to their long experience, are more 
aware of the consequences of the disasters than younger people, Hajito et al. (2015) observed in Jimma, 
that young respondents (ages 18-24) have higher awareness levels than older adults (>50 years).  
 
3.1.2 Information about earthquake safety, preparedness, and risk reduction 
 
An evaluation of the availability and reach of information on earthquake safety, preparedness, and risk 
reduction is depicted in Figure 6. 80% the community leaders believe that information is not available. 
In the case of the governmental officials, more than half of them considered the availability of such 
information to be low (57.9%). The scarce availability of information suggests that there might not be 
any information, or else it exists, but it is disseminated neither among the public nor within the 
governmental officials. Only those working directly in earthquake risk management might be more 
familiar with the existence of such material. The results show that more needs to be done to develop, 
promote, and improve communication mechanisms to the public. 
 
Question: Are mechanisms available for people to inform themselves about earthquake safety, 
preparedness, and risk reduction (media, brochures, flyers, public notice boards)? 
High Moderate Low Almost 
none 
Are available and highly visible at 
different locations in your sub-city 
Are available and somewhat visible in 
some locations in your sub-city 
Are available upon 
request only 
Are not 
available 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 6 Information about earthquake safety, preparedness, and risk reduction. 
 
In the case of Jimma, it was found that the major sources of information about hazards are relatives or 
acquaintances, followed by radio broadcasting and health practitioner (Hajito et al., 2015). 
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3.1.3 User-oriented convenience of information provided on earthquake safety 
 
Figure 7 is directly linked to the previous question on availability of information on earthquake safety 
but captures how the information is presented (different languages which exist within the country). 
Again, the results show that more needs to be done to develop, promote, and improve communication 
mechanisms to the public. 
 
Question: Is earthquake risk, safety, preparedness, and risk reduction materials available in different languages 
in your sub-city? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Are available and highly visible at 
different locations in your sub-city 
Are available and somewhat visible in 
some locations in your sub-city 
Are available upon 
request only 
Are not 
available 
 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
Figure 7 User friendliness of information provided on earthquake safety. 
 
3.1.4. Public outreach activities  
 
 The distribution of scores that pertain to public outreach activities to inform disaster safety, 
preparedness and risk reduction is depicted in Figure 8. Both government officials and community 
participants characterized such activities as low and almost non-existent (>80% in both cases). Efforts 
are still necessary to inform a wider audience about what is being done to increase disaster safety, 
preparedness, and risk reduction and about the role of the community in supporting those efforts. 
 
Question: Do public outreach activities exist for the public to inform themselves about disaster safety, 
preparedness and risk reduction (e.g. earthquake safety drills and demonstrations, or meetings in 
neighbourhoods on family emergency planning)? 
High Moderate Low Almost 
none 
Often and regularly held with 
widespread participation 
Sometimes held with some 
participation 
Rarely held with limited 
participation 
Never held 
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(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
Figure 8 Public outreach activities. 
 
 
3.1.5. Participation in public outreach services  
 
The scoring of community leaders and local government representatives regarding their participation in 
public outreach services about disaster safety, preparedness, and risk reduction is presented in Figure 9. 
The community leaders and the governmental officials seemed to agree (60% vs 78.9% respectively) on 
acknowledging their almost-null level of participation in outreach activities on disaster safety, 
preparedness, and risk reduction. 
 
Question: Have you or someone you know participated in public outreach services to be informed about 
disaster safety, preparedness and risk reduction? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
In most cases In some cases In a few cases Never 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 9 Participation in public outreach services. 
It is necessary to implement the framework developed by the government for engaging communities. 
These can be achieved by leveraging informal initiatives and support formal ones. There are informal 
initiatives at the sub-city and community level for service delivery. It includes building capacity among 
city officials and community members and improving coordination, rather than maintaining fragmented 
initiatives (WB & GFDRR, 2015).  
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3.1.6. Training and capacity building programs  
 
The scoring distribution for the prevalence of training and capacity building programs to increase 
technical and professional resources for earthquake risk reduction is presented in Figure 10.  100% of 
the community representatives and about 85% of the government officials concurred that no good 
programs existed for capacity building and that a few limited ones are offered only sporadically.  
  
Question: To what extent have training and capacity building programs to increase technical and 
professional resources for earthquake risk reduction been put in place? 
High Moderate Low Almost 
none 
Many different types of programs that are 
effectively implemented and regularly reviewed 
Some programs 
implemented periodically 
Limited programs 
offered sporadically 
No 
programs 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 10 Training and capacity building programs. 
 
To increase the number of training and capacity building programs, it is necessary to implement the 
policy directions and strategies regarding implementation capacity described in the National Policy and 
Strategy on Disaster Risk Management formulated by the Government. These strategies include 
undertaking regular capacity building activities, establishing a training centre on disaster risk 
management (Contreras, 2001), identifying and scaling up disaster risk management best practices and 
developing a roster of trained personnel that can be deployed in times of disasters (Ethiopia, 2014). 
 
3.2 Social capacity 
The objective of the social capacity dimension is to identify the capacity of populations to prepare 
efficiently, respond and recover from damaging earthquakes. This theme encompasses resources for 
social assistance to the community, integration of the population, the interaction between private and 
governmental officials with the community, the participation of community leaders in decision-making 
and the protection of historic buildings and cultural heritage. Social capacity also covers community 
health and well-being. Results and ancillary information are presented in the following sections. 
 
3.2.1 Healthcare and social assistance programs available for vulnerable groups 
 
The scores of community leaders and representatives of government officials regarding the prevalence 
of healthcare and social assistance programs for vulnerable groups are presented in Figure 11. It is also 
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a measure of differential access to resources, in this case, access to healthcare and social assistance. The 
burdent of unequal access to resources is often borne by the more socially vulnerable populations. 
Socially vulnerable populations will likely experience the consequences of an earthquake differentially, 
even though they are subjected to similar levels of ground shaking. Understanding the differential 
impacts of an earthquake as a product of characteristics that give rise to vulnerability is a critical 
element for fostering mitigation plans and the development of policy to reduce earthquake risk. About 
70% of both community leaders and government officials consider that healthcare and social assistance 
programs for vulnerable groups are either very limited or non-existent highlighting the need to do more 
in this important area. 
 
 
Question: Are healthcare and social assistance programs available for vulnerable groups (e.g. free 
clinics)? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Many programs with 
excellent service 
Few programs with good 
service 
Limited programs with poor 
service 
No programs 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 11 Healthcare and social assistance programs available for vulnerable groups. 
 
According to the World Bank (WB) and the Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery 
(GFDRR) (2015), the most vulnerable groups in Addis Ababa do not have access to the social services. 
The Bureau of Labour and Social Affairs (BOLSA) identified five categories of the vulnerable population: 
the elderly; the disabled; street people/beggars; the poor; and sex workers. Many people, however, fall 
into more than one category making the social protection system inefficient. A better understanding of 
the needs of the vulnerable population in Addis Ababa is needed to improve the delivery of social 
programs. 
 
3.2.2 Ties and connections between people in the Sub-cities 
 
The results of perceived ties and connections between people in the Sub cities is depicted in Figure 12. 
Many of the participants both community and governmental consider some people know each other, 
but strong ties do not exist. 26.3% of the governmental officials scored the high category. These results 
show that it may be necessary to create systems within the communities in sub-cities for building 
capacities that can support community resilience and health. 
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Question: What degree of ties and connections exist between people in your sub-city? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Most people know each other 
well, and many have strong 
ties 
Most people know each other 
well, and a few have strong 
ties 
Some people know each 
other, but few have strong 
ties 
Most people do 
not know each 
other at all 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 12 Ties and connections between people in the sub-cities. 
 
3.2.3 Social integration considering different economic levels 
 
 
Scoring regarding social integration considering different socioeconomic levels is presented in Figure 13. 
Community leaders, as well as the governmental officials, scored mostly in the low-moderate range. 
According to them, not much segregation exists. Within such programs, specific activities could be 
developed to promote a better connection between community members. 
 
 
Question: What is the degree of social integration considering different economic levels within the sub-
city? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
 
(a) community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 13 Social integration considering different economic levels. 
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3.2.4 Access to electricity, gas, and drinking water 
 
The scores from community leaders and representatives from governmental officials regarding the 
access to electricity, gas, and drinking water are depicted in Figure 14. 60% of the community leaders 
over 70% of the government officials consider that there is a Moderate-High access. 
 
Question: What is the level of access of your sub-city's population to electricity, gas, and drinking 
water? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Widespread access Some access Limited access Very little 
access 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 14 Access to electricity, gas, and drinking water. 
 
The key resilience features in a critical infrastructure such as water supply, power system, and gas 
provision are robustness/resistance, resourcefulness, response and recovery and adaptability (Panteli & 
Mancarella, 2015). Addis Ababa depends on surface and groundwater to provide drinking water to the 
population. In this sense, it is necessary to identify other potential sources of water, such as rain and 
storm water catchments for gray-water uses such as industry, landscaping, and cleaning. Additionally, it 
is mandatory to tackle the 36.5 percent of estimated leakage of water supply to improve this service. To 
achieve this objective, it is essential to make more efficient the maintenance and the response to 
reported breakages. The operational efficiency and monitoring need to be improved, as well to increase 
the potential and avoid over extraction. Regarding wastewater collection is necessary to invest in piped 
sewerage and decentralised treatment facilities (WB & GFDRR, 2015). The rapid growth of the city 
demands to increase in power and gas generation capacity and efficient transmission and distribution 
system. The Addis Ababa City Government (AACG) and the companies should collaborate to ensure 
proper and timely planning of needed infrastructure for basic services according to the city 
development (WB & GFDRR, 2015).  
 
3.2.5 Primary education 
 
The scoring of community leaders and government representatives regarding the access to primary 
education is described in Figure 15. 90% and 94.7% of the community leaders and governmental 
representatives respectively, consider that almost all people have reached this level. This score shows a 
good perception and more so where both parties agree.  
 
  30 
 
Question: How many people in your sub-city have at least a primary education? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Almost all Many A few None 
 
(a) Community leaders  
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 15 Primary education. 
Addis Ababa has a policy for universal provision of basic services such as education but is struggling to 
provide equal access to poor, who are not formally registered (WB & GFDRR, 2015). Therefore, it is 
necessary to include all the population in the national census that their needs such as access to 
education can be identified and covered. 
 
3.2.6 Social integration of minority populations 
 
The scoring of community leaders and representatives of government officials regarding the social 
integration of minority populations is presented in Figure 16. Membership in a minority group often 
contributes to susceptibility to loss or harm from hazard events (Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003). This 
susceptibility is partially due to marginalization and poverty that may result from being a member of a 
minority group. There was a 20% score within the almost none category for the community leaders 
however there was a 39% and 40% score in the moderate category for governmental officials and 
community leaders, respectively. 
 
 
Question: What is the degree of social integration of minority populations (e.g. minority tribes) within 
the sub-city? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
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(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 16 Social integration of minority populations. 
 
It would be necessary to carry out consultation and engagement of minorities to ensure that the system 
covers the needs of the entire population (WB & GFDRR, 2015). Activities, such as the RPS contributes to 
considering a wider range of vulnerabilities, risk management capacities, and localized information.  
3.2.7 Interaction between formal (governmental) and informal officials 
 
The perceived level of interaction between formal and informal officials is described in Figure 17. All 
categories were represented in the scores. 50% of the community leaders believe there were moderate 
interactions, which is quite impressive. However, it is interesting to note that 47% of the governmental 
representatives felt there was a low level of interaction. Such discordance maybe due to some 
government members not being directly involved with/within the community. Such relationships are 
important for the reduction of earthquake risk and to increase resilience communication from the 
grassroots, through all levels of government (Anhorn, Burton, & Khazai, 2014). 
 
Question: What is the level of interaction between formal (governmental) and informal officials? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Widespread Some Few Almost none 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 17 Interaction between formal (governmental) and informal officials. 
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3.2.8 Participation in decision making  
 
Following the previous question, Figure 18 presents the scores regarding the participation of members 
of the sub-cities in decision-making processes. In this case, nearly 60% of the community participants & 
73% of the governmental representatives consider an almost none - low participation, while the other 
40% of the community is split equally between moderate – high engagement. These results suggest the 
need to promote a wider participation of community leaders in projects for earthquake risk 
management. 
 
Question: To what extent are residents in your sub-city effectively engaged and heard in decisions made 
by authorities? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Just about always Most of the time Some of the time Never 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 18 Participation in decision-making. 
 
3.2.9 Programs for the protection of historic buildings and cultural heritage  
 
 
The scoring for programs for the protection of historic buildings and cultural heritage is depicted in 
Figure 19. Results show that 80% of the community leaders and 84% of the representatives of 
governmental officials consider no preservation programs exist for the protection of cultural heritage. 
Given the status of programs, a starting point may be improved communication of the results and 
benefits of such efforts. Also, given the city’s historical and cultural heritage value, technical and 
financial resources could be promoted for the retrofitting of public and private buildings. 
 
 
Question: Are special programs in place to protect historic buildings and cultural heritages if a damaging 
earthquake were to occur? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Programs are in place to 
protect both private and 
public historic buildings and 
cultural heritage 
Programs are in place to 
protect only historic public 
buildings and cultural 
heritage 
Only on individual bases 
historic buildings and cultural 
heritage are preserved 
No preservation 
programs exist 
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(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 19 Programs for the protection of historic buildings and cultural heritage. 
 
3.3 Legal and Institutional Arrangements 
The objective of the legal and institutional arrangements dimension is to identify how effective 
mechanisms are at advocating earthquake risk reduction in the city. This dimension encompasses 
regulations for earthquake risk reduction, the participation of community leaders, mechanisms of 
coordination between sub-cities, private and public organizations, and the confidence of public and 
private officials in risk management. The status and current achievements in such topics, as well as the 
scores obtained in the workshop, are presented in the following sections. Ethiopia has a national policy 
legal framework for disaster risk reduction (DRMFSS, 2013; Ethiopia, 2014), but few studies tackle 
community awareness and perception about common disasters (Hajito et al., 2015). 
 
 
3.3.1 Regulations, ordinances, or incentives for earthquake safety and risk reduction 
 
The scoring to better understand the effectiveness of regulations, ordinances, or incentives for 
earthquake safety and risk reduction in the city is presented in Figure 20. 40% of the community 
representatives consider that regulations do not exist, and the other 60% felt that they do exist but they 
have not been implemented. 53% of governmental officials believe that such regulations do not exist.  
 
Question: Have regulations, ordinances, or incentives for earthquake safety and risk reduction been 
effective for your sub-city? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Most regulations have been 
fully implemented 
Some regulations have been 
implemented 
Regulations exist, but they 
have not been implemented 
Regulations do 
not exist 
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(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 20 Regulations, ordinances, or incentives for earthquake safety and risk reduction. 
 
This answer is paradoxical, having a National Policy and Strategy on Disaster Risk Management 
formulated by the National Government and issued in July 2013 (Ethiopia, 2014). One of the points in 
this document is enforcing laws and directives. Nevertheless, it would be necessary to start with the 
dissemination among governmental officials and community of this document. Afterward, it is necessary 
to research about the progress about meeting regulations, ordinance and incentives for earthquake 
safety and risk reduction achieved up to now since 2013.  
 
3.3.2 Community leaders with roles and responsibilities for Disaster Risk Reduction  
 
The scoring for community leaders and representatives of government officials that pertain to roles and 
responsibilities of community leaders for disaster risk reduction is presented in Figure 21. 30% of the 
community leaders consider that there are no persons with such functions and 20% said there are 
people but with no experience. On the contrary, 52% of the participants from governmental officials 
voted for the high category. Such differences are likely to be related to the low community engagement 
in the decision-making of community-related DRR activities. Having community members with clear 
roles and responsibilities before, during, and after a hazard event may assure a timely response and 
recovery (UNISDR, 2012; Anhorn, J. et al., 2014). 
 
 
Question: Are there people within the city with clear roles and responsibilities for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (DRR)? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
There are designated and 
trained persons whose main 
function is DRR 
There are designated and 
trained persons, but their 
main function is not DRR 
There are persons without 
training or expertise, and 
their main function is not DRR 
There are no 
persons with 
such functions 
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(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 21 Community leaders with roles and responsibilities for Disaster Risk Reduction. 
 
3.3.3 Mechanisms of coordination and cooperation  
 
The scoring of the community leaders and government officials that pertain to mechanisms of 
coordination and cooperation for disaster preparedness, safety and risk reduction between 1) sub-cities 
with the national government; 2) sub-cities with other sub-cities; and 3) sub-cities and private 
enterprises are presented in Figures 22, 23 and 24. 
 
Question: To what extent are there well-defined mechanisms of coordination and cooperation for 
disaster preparedness, safety and risk reduction between your city and the national government? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Very strong coordination and 
excellent cooperation 
Somewhat strong 
coordination and cooperation 
Limited coordination and 
weak cooperation 
No coordination or 
cooperation 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 22 Mechanisms of coordination and cooperation between sub-cities. 
 
 
Question: To what extent are there well-defined mechanisms of coordination and cooperation for 
disaster preparedness, safety and risk reduction between your sub city and neighbouring sub-cities? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Very strong coordination and 
excellent cooperation 
Somewhat strong 
coordination and cooperation 
Limited coordination and 
weak cooperation 
No coordination 
or cooperation 
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(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 23 Mechanisms of coordination and cooperation: sub-cities and the municipality. 
 
Question: To what extent are there well-defined mechanisms of coordination and cooperation for 
disaster preparedness, safety and risk reduction between your sub-city and private enterprises? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Very strong coordination and 
excellent cooperation 
Somewhat strong 
coordination and cooperation 
Limited coordination and 
weak cooperation 
No coordination 
or cooperation 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 24 Mechanisms of coordination and cooperation: sub-cities and private enterprises. 
 
It is worth noting that 50% of the community leaders group consider that mechanisms of coordination 
and cooperation for disaster preparedness between the city and the national government are somewhat 
strong coordination whereas 50% of the governmental representatives felt there were limited 
coordination and weak cooperation. Within sub-city to sub-city, 50 % of community leaders scored in 
the very strong – somewhat strong coordination and cooperation, while again 50% of the government 
representatives scored in the limited coordination and weak cooperation. However, with the interaction 
between sub-cities and private enterprises, both concurred that there was limited – no coordination 
and cooperation. These results suggest that communities and government are not aware of the 
alternatives for coordination for disaster risk management. An additional area of opportunity is 
coordination and cooperation with private enterprises for disaster preparedness, safety, and risk 
reduction. 
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3.3.4 Confidence in the central and local government and non-governmental officials  
 
The level of confidence in the central and local governments, as well as non-governmental officials for 
response and recovery from damaging earthquake events, is showed in Figures 25, 26 and 27. 
 
Question: How much confidence do you have in the central government to prepare for, respond and 
recover from a damaging earthquake? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Widespread confidence Some confidence Limited confidence Very little confidence 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 25 Confidence in the central government. 
 
Question: How much confidence do you have in the local government to prepare for, respond and 
recover from a damaging earthquake? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Widespread confidence Some confidence Limited confidence Very little confidence 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 26 Confidence in the local government. 
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Question: How much confidence do you have in non-governmental officials (NGO’s) acting jointly to 
prepare for, respond and recover from a damaging earthquake? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Widespread confidence Some confidence Limited confidence Very little confidence 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 27 Confidence in non-governmental officials (NGO’s).  
 
The results demonstrate a general lack of trust in the government (both the local governments and the 
central governments) and a lack of trust in NGO’s to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
damaging earthquakes. What is interesting to note as well is how the government officials themselves 
seem not to trust in themselves and the NGOs. These results show the need for strengthening the 
confidence of the community in the government and vice versa. 
3.4 Planning, Regulation, and Mainstreaming Risk Mitigation 
The objective of the planning, regulation, and mainstreaming risk mitigation theme is to identify the 
perceived level of commitment and mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction through regulatory 
planning tools in the city. This theme encompasses earthquake-resistant building codes, the 
reinforcement of private infrastructure, the availability of insurance and funds for disaster risk 
management plans. The status and current achievements in planning and risk mitigation as well the 
scores obtained during the workshop are presented in the following sections. 
 
3.4.1 Earthquake resistant building construction codes  
 
The voting distribution for the enforcement of earthquake-resistant building construction codes is 
depicted in Figure 28. The community leaders had 50% saying codes do not exist while the other 50% 
believed that they were not enforced. Over 52% of the participants of governmental officials considered 
that they were not enforced. Only 10.5% of the governmental participants, overall, voted within the 
moderate category. There is a need to provide workshops to key government and municipal/local 
government officials on the existence of the risk reduction guidelines. For example, the country has the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS) program designed to strengthen Ethiopia’s disaster 
preparedness coordination and response capacity, which is run by the Ministry of Agriculture Disaster 
Risk Management and Food Security Sector (DRMFSS). The city of Addis has the Fire Emergency 
Prevention and Rescue Authority (FEPRA) which together with the Oromia Region Disaster Prevention 
and Preparedness Bureau can go a long way in holding sensitization, safety awareness and capacity 
building rallies, workshops, information workshops. 
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Question: To your knowledge are earthquake safety, and risk reduction guidelines for new development 
recognized and enforced in your sub-city? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Enforced for some cases Enforced for a few cases Not enforced Codes do not exist 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 28 Earthquake resistant building construction codes. 
3.4.2 Reinforcement and retrofitting of private infrastructure  
 
The reinforcement and retrofitting of private infrastructure are presented in Figure 29. In the case of 
community leaders, only 30% scored in the low category showing that they believed that construction 
codes were being enforced in their area. However, there was less certainty within the governmental 
group, with most of them (over 50%) scoring in the almost none-Low category.  
 
Question: To your knowledge are earthquake-resistant building construction codes enforced in your 
sub-city? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Carried out for most private 
infrastructure 
Carried out for some private 
infrastructure 
Carried out for limited 
private infrastructure 
Rarely carried out 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 29 Reinforcement and retrofitting of private infrastructure. 
 
In 1980 the first seismic code for building in Ethiopia was introduced (CPI-78)(Kassegne, Engeda, 
Kebede, & Tessema, 2012). This code was revised in 1984 as ESCP1-83 ("ESCP-1:1983, Code of Practice 
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for Loading ", 1983). These two codes were followed by a significant change introduced in 1995 called 
EBCS-1995 by the Ministry of Works and Urban Development ("EBCS-8: 1995, Code  of Standars for 
Seismic Loads," 1995). Despite, the existence of three generations of seismic code in Ethiopia, its law 
enforcement was never codified by the country’s legal systems until 2009. In this year, the Building 
Proclamation 624/2009 was introduced as a legal document that summarizes the building regulations 
and requirements, to be used by local authorities. The delay in the codification of the law enforcement 
could explain the lack of awareness of official about the existence of a building construction code 
((FDRE), 2009). The necessary action is the socialization of the Building Construction Code of 1995 
(EBCS-1995) especially among the officials in the Governmental Institutions. 
 
3.4.3 Availability and use of earthquake insurance  
 
The scores regarding the availability and use of earthquake insurance within the city are shown in Figure 
30. Most of the community leaders (90%) and governmental officials (89.5%) consider that no insurance 
is available or utilized.  
 
Question: Is earthquake insurance available and utilized by residents and businesses? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Extensive availability 
exists/utilized for most 
residences and businesses 
Some availability exists/some 
utilization for residences and 
businesses 
Limited availability exists No insurance is 
available or 
utilized 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 30 Availability and use of earthquake insurance. 
 
 
The low insurance penetration in Addis Ababa stems from the low frequency of earthquake events, 
compared with floods, fires, droughts and disease outbreaks (Hajito et al., 2015). This fact accounts for 
the perception that earthquake risk is lower than it is (Bevere & Grollimund, 2012).  
 
Activities such as the RPS facilitates the awareness of the community about the risk in which they are 
living. These kinds of activities must be encouraged and the results disseminated to foster actions such 
as increasing the penetration of the insurance among the community.  
 
 
3.4.4 Availability of funding 
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The availability of funding for disaster risk management plans or earthquake mitigation programs is 
presented in Figure 31. 90% of the community leaders believe that some availability and utilization exist 
contrary to the governmental officials of whom 40% were of the same opinion. These results reflect a 
huge disparity between the community and government, and more information would need to be found 
to understand this difference.  
 
 
Question: Are you aware of the availability of disaster risk management plans or earthquake mitigation 
funding that is available for your sub-city? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Extensive availability 
exists/utilized 
Some availability exists/some 
utilization 
Limited availability exists No availability 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 31 Availability of funding. 
 
3.5 Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery 
The objective of emergency preparedness, response, and recovery theme is to identify the effectiveness 
and performance of the risk management system within the city for response and recovery in the 
aftermath of a damaging earthquake event. The theme encompasses the inaction of community 
response centres, the prevalence of standard operational procedures and funds for emergency planning 
and response. Also, this theme covers workforce and equipment available for emergency situations, and 
plans for post-earthquake emergency operations. The status and current achievements as well the 
scores obtained during the workshop and presented in the following sections. 
 
3.5.1 Population storing goods to be used in case of disasters  
 
The scores drafted from the responses of community leaders and representatives of the city’s 
governmental officials that regard the storage of goods to be used in case of an earthquake disaster are 
described in Figure 32. Around 90% of the community leaders consider that few to almost none of the 
population stores goods to be used in case of an earthquake disaster. The same trend can be seen for 
the governmental officials. According to these results, very few people store goods. 
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Question: To your knowledge, do people in your sub-city store food, water, and fuel that will be 
available for more than one week following an earthquake? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Most Some Few Almost None 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 32 Population is storing goods to be used in case of disasters. 
If they do not already exist, FEPRA could create a new unit(s) with defined roles and responsibilities 
focusing on risk management and preparedness for major incidents. The low preparedness in these 
aspect makes the city highly vulnerable. The city seems to be in an emerging state regarding the key 
pillars of disaster risk reduction – prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The 
combination between well-functioning and inclusive disaster preparedness and emergency response 
mechanism will make the city more resilient (WB & GFDRR, 2015). FEPRA could also develop the 
emergency preparedness plan suggested by the World Bank (WB) and Global Forum for the Disaster 
Risk Reduction (GFDRR) (2015). This plan covers aspects such as recommendations for the community 
about storing goods to be used in case of disasters. It would also be necessary to say which kind of 
goods, the reason to keep them and how to keep them usable and how to use them. This information 
can be defined in manuals and socialized in workshops. The government would then provide some of 
the goods in case of disaster for highly vulnerable communities. 
 
3.5.2 Local centres  
 
The presence of centres within communities that are used for implementing and coordinating 
emergency response in the event of an earthquake is depicted in Figure 33. At least 60% of the 
community leaders scored high and where of the opinion that local centres were available. 
Nevertheless, the governmental representatives were split in their opinions. Community residents might 
identify a certain community centre as serving such a purpose while those in government do not view it 
in that way. There might be a need to educate both parties on the existence of such centres and identify 
them. 
 
Question: Do you have a local centre for implementing and coordinating emergency response and 
management? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Available and fully operational Available but partially operational Available but not operational Not available 
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(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 33 Local centres for emergency response and management. 
In Ethiopia, there is an organisational structure created from the national to the district level, called 
disaster prevention and preparedness committee (Hajito et al., 2015). However, these committees need 
a physical headquarter (Contreras, 2001). The community must easily identify them, and all of them 
must be equally distributed around the city, either with similar service areas (response areas) or with 
smaller service areas, where the zones will be highly vulnerable. 
 
 
3.5.3 Standard operational procedures  
 
The scoring regarding the presence and use of standard operating procedures for coordinating 
emergency, rescue and response activities are presented in Figure 34. As found in the previous topic, 
there are differences in the scores of community leaders and governmental officials. 50% of the 
community leaders and 50 % of government representatives consider that there are limited operational 
procedures. On the other hand, 50% of the community leaders scored in the moderate category while 
5% of the representatives from public officials consider that there are well-defined procedures, 20% said 
none existed and 25% considered that they were moderate. 
 
Question: Are there standard operational procedures (SOP) that include communication plans for 
coordinating emergency rescue and response activities of relevant units in your sub-city (e.g. Incident 
Command System)? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Well defined procedures, and 
fully functional for all relevant 
units 
Basic procedures, with limited 
functionality for all relevant 
units 
Limited procedures for some 
units 
No operational 
procedures 
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(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 34 Standard operational procedures for emergency rescue and response activities. 
 
Protocols for emergency response must be written under the agreement of all the operative officials, 
e.g. FEPRA, Civil Protection, Red Cross and Police. This process must be led by FEPRA. The topics of the 
protocols must be first response, search, and rescue (SAR), emergency response to floods, landslides, 
Hazmat, forest fires, etc. However, based on the answers from the community and the governmental 
officials, and based on previous answers, it is possible to assume that these protocols could already exist 
but they have been neither among the government officials nor the community or else simply people 
are not aware that they exist. It is necessary to organize workshops and drills to put them in practice 
and implement continuous improvement. 
 
 
3.5.4 Funds for emergency preparedness, response and recovery operations  
 
The availability of funds for emergency preparedness, response and recovery operations is depicted in 
Figure 35. Many of the community leaders 60%, consider that funds are available but with legal 
restrictions and special requirements while the governmental officials, less than 40% either consider 
that such funds are not enough or are available but with legal restrictions. These results may be the 
result of both availability types existing for a given area. Conversely, this may be due to a lack of 
knowledge of available funds in a given area.  
 
Question: Are funds available for emergency preparedness, response, and recovery operations? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Funds are directly available 
and can be used at the Sub 
City’s discretion 
Funds are available but with 
legal restrictions and special 
requirements 
Funds are planned for but are 
not available 
Funds are not 
available 
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(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 35 Funds for emergency preparedness, response and recovery operations. 
 
3.5.5 Human resources for emergency preparedness, response and recovery operations 
 
The scoring for human resources for emergency preparedness, response and recovery operations is 
rendered in Figure 36. Results show that many of the community leaders (90%), and governmental 
representatives, 85% consider that there are insufficient – limited human resources. This concordance 
shows that more does need to be done in training and making available skilled personnel for response 
and recovery. 
 
Question: Are human resources that are coordinated and trained available for emergency 
preparedness, response and recovery operations (including volunteers and/or community 
organizations)? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Many human resources 
available 
Some human resources 
available 
Limited human resources 
available 
Insufficient human 
available 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 36 Human resources for emergency preparedness, response, and recovery operations. 
 
 
3.5.6 Equipment for emergency rescue, response, and clean-up operations 
 
The results for equipment for emergency rescue, response, and clean-up operations are presented in 
Figure 37. Around 35% of the participants from public officials consider that no equipment exists that is 
readily available; 30% consider it low, and around 30% consider it moderate. The same trend of results 
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can be seen for the community leaders making these results inconclusive. There is a clear lack of 
knowledge from both groups whether such equipment exists. Maybe examples of types of equipment 
could have been made for the question to be clearer. 
 
 
Question: Is equipment readily available that can be used for prompt and effective emergency rescue, 
response, and clean-up operations? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Many equipment types exist 
that are readily available 
Some equipment types exist 
that are readily available 
Some equipment types exist, 
but they are not readily 
available 
No equipment 
exists that is 
readily available 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 37 Equipment for emergency rescue, response, and clean-up operations. 
 
3.5.7 Response plan for post-earthquake emergency operations  
 
This sub-section presents results about response plans for post-earthquake recovery of the following 
eight sectors. The aforementioned sectors (i) access and distribution of drinking water and sanitation 
services; (ii) promotion of health and hygiene; (iii) infrastructure and rehabilitation; (iv) integral 
assistance to the population; (v) Integral safety of the population; (vi) productivity and livelihood 
stability; (viI) education, culture and environment and (viii) strategic infrastructure for development. 
Such sectors are considered by the Metropolitan System of Risk Management of Addis Ababa for the 
development of contingency plans. 
 
(i) Health and sanitation: From Figure 38, around 55% of the participants from governmental 
officials consider that no plans exist, and 22% consider that plans do exist but are not 
implemented. On the other hand, 60% of the community leaders thought that plans do exist 
but are not implemented while 40% said no plans exist. Given that all community leaders 
scored in the bottom half, it should be considered beneficial to promote programs for 
information about plans for health and sanitation. 
 
 
 
Question: Is there a response plan for post-earthquake emergency operations; access to potable water 
and sanitation services? 
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High Moderate Low Almost none 
Plan exists, implemented, and 
regularly updated 
Plan exists and implemented Plan exists but not 
implemented 
No plan exists 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 38 Response plan for post-earthquake emergency operations for health. 
 
(ii) Search and rescue: Figure 39 presents the scores of community leaders and representatives from 
governmental officials regarding plans for post-earthquake search and rescue. The results were 
inconclusive due the varying responses received, all being representative of the four categories; 
however, it can be noted that most scored in the low and almost none categories for both community 
leaders and governmental representatives. It is important to note that the recovery time of a 
community often depends on the response time following a disaster. 
 
 
Question: Is there a response plan for post-earthquake emergency operations available for search and 
rescue? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Plan exists, implemented, and 
regularly updated 
Plan exists and 
implemented 
Plan exists but not 
implemented 
No plan exists 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 39 Response plan for post-earthquake emergency operations for search and rescue. 
It is necessary to establish training programs in medium and heavy SAR for members of FEPRA, civil 
protection, Red Cross and Police, and light SAR for members of the community. The community must 
also be trained in first response and first aid. Besides the search and rescue plan, it is necessary to 
formulate a plan to organize the building survey in the city to estimate their degree of damage 
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(Contreras, 2009). An accurate estimation of the population that needs public shelter is critical for 
effective disaster response decision-making (Vecere, Monteiro, Ammann, Giovinazzi, & Melo Santos, 
2017). This activity allows determining the number of people, who have to evacuate and probably will 
be in need of shelter.  
 
(iii) Mass care including shelter: the voting for plans for integral assistance for the population is 
presented in Figure 40. Again, the results were more inclined towards the low scores showing that such 
plans may not exist.  
 
 
Question: Is there a response plan for post-earthquake emergency operations available for mass care 
services including shelter? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Plan exists, implemented, and 
regularly updated 
Plan exists and implemented Plan exists but not 
implemented 
No plan exists 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 40 Response plan for post-earthquake emergency operations for integral assistance. 
 
The shelter is an essential component of a pre-impact recovery plan. The short-term shelter demand 
can result in a temporary housing need for homeless population due to the earthquake, which will be a 
responsibility (Vecere et al., 2017). This plan should include a spatial component, where the places for 
shelter are already predefined (Contreras, 2001) according to certain service areas. Recently several 
models for short-term shelter needs have been developed: SYNER-G, HAZUS-MH, ERGO-EQ, MCEER 
shelter model, InaSAFE and RiskScape (Vecere et al., 2017). Another option would be to consider the 
possibility of allocating financial support for families that host people in need of shelters to avoid the 
occupation of public facilities such as parks, community or sports centres. It is important to remember 
that schools should not be used as shelters because their occupation could delay the return to 
normality. 
 
(iv) Population Security: Figure 41 shows that for community leaders, they believe that plans exist and 
are implemented with 50% scoring in the moderate category and 30% in the high. However, the 
government officials’ results were inconclusive as they almost had an equal representation of scores in 
all the categories.  
 
Question: Is there a response plan for post-earthquake emergency operations available for population 
security? 
  
49 
49 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Plan exists, implemented, and 
regularly updated 
Plan exists and implemented Plan exists but not 
implemented 
No plan exists 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 41 Response plan for post-earthquake operations for integral safety and security. 
It is necessary to check if effectively the plan exists. If it does, then it should be socialized into the 
population, and if does not exist, then a plan should be formulated by the members of the operative 
officials lead by the Police Department of Addis Ababa with the support of the National Army. Private 
security companies could also be invited. The plan should be discussed amongst all these officials and 
then implemented. It is important to have a plan in this aspect to avoid lootings or any other kind of 
unrest. 
 
(v) Continuation of economic and livelihood activities: All participants both from government officials 
and community leaders did not fully agree on whether or not plans existed for the continuation of 
economic and livelihood activities. This conclusion is depicted in Figure 42. 
 
Question: Is there a response plan for post-earthquake emergency operations available for continuation 
of economic and livelihood activities? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Plan exists, implemented, and 
regularly updated 
Plan exists and implemented Plan exists but not 
implemented 
No plan exists 
 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 42 Response plan for post-earthquake operations for productivity and livelihoods. 
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Unfortunately, the existence of Business Continuity Plan (BCP) is very uncommon in the public sector 
and more common in the private sector. BCPs attempt to formulate a plan at pre-disaster to restart key 
business operations to a minimum acceptable predefined level (i.e., Minimum Business Continuity 
Objective (MBCO). The restoration process must start immediately after a disruptive event within the 
so-called Maximum Tolerable Period of Disruption (MTPD) through referring appropriate BC plan(s) 
(Sahebjamnia, Torabi, & Mansouri, 2015). Disaster Recovery Planning (DRP) endeavors to ensure the full 
recovery (restoration) of all disrupted operations to their normal business state at post-disaster 
(ISO:22310, 2012; Sahebjamnia et al., 2015). 
 
The lack of proactive BC and DR planning could lead to loss of reputation and market share. It can also 
bring customer service and business process failure, regulatory liability and increased resuming and 
restoring times (Herbane, Elliott, & Swartz, 2004; Hiles, 2010; Losada, Scaparra, & O'Hanley, 2012; 
Sahebjamnia et al., 2015). The BCP must be formulated in combination with contingency plans to ensure 
that managers know when to switch from continuity to the recovery phase and allocate resources after 
the occurrence of disruptive incidents (Sahebjamnia et al., 2015).  
 
(vi) Critical infrastructure and rehabilitation: Figure 43 shows that around the 50% of the community 
leaders consider that plans existed and were implemented. However, from the results of the 
government officials, it seemed that 42.1% were not convinced such plans even exist. 
 
Question: Is there a response plan for post-earthquake emergency operations available for critical 
infrastructure repair (e.g. bridges, roads, and rail)? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Plan exists, implemented, and 
regularly updated 
Plan exists and implemented Plan exists but not 
implemented 
No plan exists 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 43 Response plan for post-earthquake operations for infrastructure and rehabilitation.  
 
The lack of existence of a contingency or emergency response plans in critical infrastructure increases 
the vulnerability and reduce the resilience of the society. The key resilience features in a critical 
infrastructure are robustness/resistance, resourcefulness, response and recovery and adaptability 
(Panteli & Mancarella, 2015). The formulation of the response plans makes it possible to visualize the 
potential damages and failures in the systems to determine the procedures to face them and the 
alternative solutions. Another item to include in the plan would be to allocate responsibility for the 
repair and restoration of each component of the infrastructure. The existence of this plan reduces the 
occurrence of secondary or cascading effects. These plans should be formulated jointly by private 
companies, the government, and the city officials of Addis Ababa.  
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(vii) Residential building and recovery: most of the community leaders were not in agreement as to 
whether or not plans existed for residential rebuilding while 47.4% of the government officials 
considered that no plan exists. This situation is described in Figure 44. 
 
Question: Is there a response plan for post-earthquake emergency operations available for residential 
rebuilding and recovery? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Plan exists, implemented, and 
regularly updated 
Plan exists and implemented Plan exists but not 
implemented 
No plan exists 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 44 Response plan for post-earthquake operations. 
 
The implementation of this plan should start with the formalization of property rights, which are usually 
an issue when grants are allocated for reconstruction. The plan could also include the promotion of 
insurance. The quick reconstruction of houses in Christchurch after the earthquakes in 2010 and 2011 in 
New Zealand was the result of the high level of insurance. The Addis Ababa City Government (AACG) 
would take the lead in the development of this plan. 
 
(viii) Educational, cultural, and environmental restoration: Figure 45 shows that 31.6% of the 
participants from public officials consider that no plan exists, 31.6% scored low. As for the community 
leaders, 40% scored in the moderate and 30% in the high.  
 
Question: Is there a response plan for post-earthquake emergency operations available for education, 
culture, and environment? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Plan exists, implemented, and 
regularly updated 
Plan exists and implemented Plan exists but not 
implemented 
No plan exists 
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(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 45 Response plan for post-earthquake emergency operations for education.  
 
In this case, the answers from both, community leaders and Governmental officials point in the same 
direction, and it is necessary that schools, entities in charge of cultural assets and natural reserves 
elaborate on contingency and BCP plans. 
 
3.6 Critical Services and Public Infrastructure Resilience 
 
The objective of this theme is to identify the resilience of critical services in case of an emergency. This 
theme encompasses the assessment, reinforcement, and reduction of structural and non-structural 
vulnerabilities of critical public infrastructure and lifelines, as well as the development business 
continuity plans and plans to repair damaged structures. Assessment, reinforcement, and retrofitting of 
critical public infrastructures such as schools and hospitals. 
 
3.6.1 Assessment, reinforcement and retrofitting of critical public infrastructures 
 
Figure 46 presents the scoring of community leaders and government representatives regarding the 
assessment, reinforcement, and retrofitting of critical public infrastructures such as schools and 
hospitals. 60% of the community leaders believe it is carried out for some critical public infrastructure 
while 57% of the government officials argued to the contrary that such mitigation was low. 
 
Question: To what extent is the assessment, reinforcement, and retrofitting of critical public 
infrastructure such as schools and hospitals carried out? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Carried out for most critical 
public infrastructure 
Carried out for some critical 
public infrastructure 
Carried out for few critical 
public infrastructure 
Not carried out 
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(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 46 Assessment, reinforcement, and retrofitting of critical public infrastructure. 
 
To protect the life of children and to guaranty the functionality of hospitals, it is compulsory to advance 
in the retrofitting of these facilities. Taking into account, the role of the hospitals in the emergency 
response, a priority in this action must be allocated to them. 
 
3.6.2 Incorporation of non-structural improvements to reduce seismic risk  
 
Health facilities 
 
The votes about the incorporation of non-structural improvements to reduce seismic risk to make 
health facilities more resilient are presented in Figure 47. Many of the participants just under 60%, from 
governmental officials, consider that such mitigation has not occurred in any hospital.  
 
 
Question: To your knowledge are specific nonstructural improvements to reduce seismic risk 
incorporated to make health facilities more resilient (e.g. tying down or relocating essential 
equipment)? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Have occurred in most health 
facilities 
Have occurred in some health 
facilities 
Have occurred in a few 
exceptional health facilities 
Have not 
occurred 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 47 Incorporation of non-structural improvements for health facilities. 
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Taking into account the role of the health facilities in response to the emergency, actions to guarantee 
the functionality of them after an earthquake must be defined and accomplished. Each health facility 
must have an emergency response plan. It must be defined by the staff and implemented through drills 
with patients. Drills should frequently be repeated, e.g. every year to make the new staff and patients 
aware of its existence and changes. 
 
 
Educational facilities 
 
The scoring that pertains to the incorporation of non-structural improvements to reduce seismic risk to 
make educational facilities more resilient is presented in Figure 48. 65% of the government officials 
consider almost none of the implementation of such mitigation works has been done while 35% scored 
low. Within this context, it is relevant to promote the assessment of non-structural vulnerabilities of 
educational facilities and promote non-structural mitigation within national and local programs.  
 
Question: To your knowledge are specific non-structural improvements to reduce seismic risk incorporated to 
make educational facilities more resilient (e.g. tying down or relocating essential equipment)? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Have occurred in most 
educational facilities 
Have occurred in some 
educational facilities 
Have occurred in a few exceptional 
educational facilities 
Have not 
occurred 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 48 Incorporation of non-structural improvements for educational facilities. 
Educational facilities constitute centres where people can share information and get support (Mutch, 
2015). Taking into account that children are considered to be a highly vulnerable set of people, actions 
to reduce the risk in this kind of facilities must be taken. One of the actions is the formulation of the 
emergency response plans of the school, which must be defined by teachers and discussed with 
parents. The implementation of this plan must be undertaken by carrying out drills with the students. 
These exercises should be done at least once a year to ensure that new students and staff of the school 
are aware of them.  
 
3.6.3  Structural improvements to reduce seismic risk in lifelines  
 
The votes of community leaders and governmental institution representatives regarding the 
incorporation of structural improvements to reduce seismic risk in lifelines are shown in Figure 49. Most 
of the participants from governmental officials, 50% consider an almost none implementation of such 
mitigation and 40% voted in the low category. Based on these results, projects oriented to the 
assessment and reduction of earthquake risk of lifelines could be promoted. 
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Question: To your knowledge are specific structural improvements to reduce seismic risk in lifelines 
incorporated (e.g. water, electricity, bridges, roads)? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Have occurred for most 
lifelines 
Have occurred for many 
lifelines 
Have occurred for a few 
exceptional cases 
Have not 
occurred 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 49 Structural improvements to reduce seismic risk in lifelines. 
 
3.6.4 Business continuity plan of local government offices  
The development and implementation of business continuity plans are delineated in Figure 50. 80% of 
the participants from the governmental officials consider that no plan exists. In this regard, more needs 
to be done to have such plans in place and make people aware of them. 
 
Question: Do your sub-city offices have a business continuity plan for the aftermath of a damaging 
earthquake? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Plan exists, implemented, and 
regularly updated 
Plan exists and implemented Plan exists but not 
implemented 
No plan exists 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 50 Business continuity plan of local government offices. 
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3.6.5 Plans for the repair or replacement of critical lifelines  
The repair or replacement of critical lifelines in the aftermath of a damaging earthquake is depicted in 
Figure 51. 36.8% of the participants from the governmental officials consider that no plan exists; while 
another 36.8% considered that plans do exists but are not implemented. More needs to be done to 
address efforts in the definition and implementation of recovery activities of public systems and lifelines 
in contingency plans. 
 
Question: Does your sub-city have a plan for the repair or replacement of critical lifelines in the 
aftermath of a damaging earthquake event (e.g., water, electricity, telephone)? 
High Moderate Low Almost none 
Plan exists, implemented, and 
regularly updated 
Plan exists and implemented Plan exists but not 
implemented 
No plan exists 
 
(a) Community leaders 
 
(b) Governmental officials 
 
Figure 51 Plans for the repair or replacement of critical lifelines. 
4 PERFORMANCE BY RESILIENCE DIMENSIONS  
 
This part seeks to assess the resilience level of Addis Ababa by analyzing the six dimensions of resilience 
as a whole rather than treating them separately, as done in the previous chapter. As seen in Table 2 and 
Figure 52, the city is not doing well in any of the six dimensions of resilience with practically all the 
normalized scores being below 0.5. It must be remembered that results close to 0 represent a very low 
resilience (almost none) and values close to 1 represent a high resilience. Community leaders, in 
general, have a less negative view of the status of the city’s resilience when compared to the view of 
government officials. Community leaders, however, score very low when characterizing the levels of 
awareness and information regarding disaster resilience and this lack of information and understanding 
may significantly affect the accuracy of their views regarding all the other dimensions of resilience. On 
the other hand, the very low values (almost all of them below 0.35) given by the government officials, 
who are in charge of leading the implementation of resilience-enhancing initiatives, may be a better 
reflection of the actual status of resilience in Addis Ababa. In this case, it must be considered the fact 
because of people all over the world, and particularly government officials, tend to be rather generous 
when self-evaluating their performance.  
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Table 2 Resilience-dimensions indices. 
Resilience dimension Community 
Leaders 
Government 
officials 
Awareness and advocacy 0.18 0.21 
Social capacity 0.49 0.49 
Legal and institutional arrangements 0.48 0.35 
Planning regulation and mainstreaming risk reduction 0.5 0.35 
Emergency preparedness, response, and recovery 0.54 0.34 
Critical services and public infrastructure resilience 0.43 0.22 
 
 
 
Figure 52 Summary of resilience-dimensions indices.  
 
The following graphs give a more comprehensive insight into how each sub-city scored in each of the six 
dimensions. They were then compared against the average scores of all sub cities and governmental 
officials in each of the dimensions to see how each sub-city performed in comparison to others. 
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Figure 53 Awareness and advocacy results summary. 
The average scores for awareness and advocacy of earthquake disaster information seen in Figure 53 
were drastically low. The government officials were convinced they were doing more, but the figure of 
0.21 is not satisfactory. Based on this graph, two sub-cities Akaki Kaliti and Gulele scored higher. This 
could be a result of more information being disseminated in these areas. Yeka and Kolife Keraniyo both 
scored 0 possibly showing a lack of attention in the distribution of information to these two areas. These 
low scores are of concern and information centres should be put up to close this wide gap. 
 
 
Figure 54 Legal and institutional arrangements result in summary. 
 
The scores given by sub-cities as shown in Figure 54 are quite high especially Gulele and Arada with four 
other sub-cities having the same average score which is just under 0.6. Comparing this with how the 
government officials scored, it can be seen that the officials are not fully convinced that the situation is 
as optimistic as it is being depicted by community leaders. Bole, Yeka and Addis Kema sub-cities seem to 
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agree with this as they scored the lowest. This gap might be due to some groups of people not knowing 
what legal/social frameworks are available to them to help protect them from earthquake disasters.  
 
 
Figure 55 Social capacity results summary. 
 
As can be noted from Figure 55, the response to this section was very positive, and it seemed most sub-
cities had very healthy social ties within their respective communities. Comparing with average scores, 
most sub-cities fell above the average scores. However, Gulele, Bole, Addis Kema and Yeka scored quite 
low and this concerning as it shows a lack of capacities of the populations within these communities to 
prepare efficiently, respond and recover from a damaging earthquake. While the government officials 
may feel they are going a great job, more still needs to be done for these sub-cities. 
 
Figure 56 Planning, Regulation, and Mainstreaming Risk Mitigation result summary. 
 
While all sub-cities thought that there were adequate plans for earthquake risk mitigation, Figure 56 
also shows that the government officials were of the opinion that this was not the case. A pessimistic 
view like this from the government shows that they are aware of the shortcomings and gives them the 
opportunity to deal with the causes of this situation. 
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Figure 57 Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery results summary. 
It can be noticed from Figure 57 that Lideta, Akaki kaliti, Arada and Addis Kema sub-cities perceive that 
there are effective emergency preparedness measures in place. However, like the previous dimension, 
the government officials do not agree with this opinion and have scored the lowest. This result may 
reflect that the officials are aware of their weaknesses and acknowledge that the effectiveness and 
performance of the risk management system of the city may need to be re-examined regarding 
response and recovery in case of emergencies. 
 
 
Figure 58 Critical Services and Public Infrastructure Resilience results summary. 
 
Akaki Kaliti, Lideta and Gulele scored highest as seen in Figure 58. However, the average score for the 
sub-cities was low. Bole and Addis Kema scored the lowest even below the government officials average 
score. There is clear mistrust on the ability of the people in charge, the capacity of lifelines and critical 
facilities to react and respond during and after earthquake events. 
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Table 3 Ranking of sub-cities according to scores for each dimension 
Dimension Top 5 Bottom 5 
Awareness and Advocacy Akaki Kaliti Bole 
Gulele Kircos 
Nefas Sikili Addis Kema 
Arada Yeka 
Lideta Kolife Keraniyo 
Social Capacity Kolife Keraniyo Kircos 
Lideta Yeka 
Akaki Kaliti Addis Kema 
Arada Bole 
Nefas Siliki Gulele 
Legal and Institutional Arrangements Gulele Lideta 
Arada Nefas Siliki 
Kolife Keraniyo Bole 
Kircos Yeka 
Akaki Kaliti Addis Kema 
Planning Regulation and Mainstreaming 
Risk Mitigation 
Kolife Keraniyo Lideta 
Gulele Nefas Siliki 
Lideta Bole 
Kircos Yeka 
Arada Addis Kema 
Emergency Preparedness Response and 
Recovery 
Lideta Nefas siliki 
Akaki Kaliti Gulele 
Arada Yeka 
Addis Kema Kolife Keraniyo 
Kircos Bole 
Critical Services and Public Infrastructure 
Resilience 
Akaki Kaliti Kircos 
 
Lideta Nefas sikili 
Gulele Kolife Keraniyo 
Arada Bole 
Yeka Addis Kema 
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Figure 59 Total score by sub-city based on community leaders.  
 
Table 3 and Figure 59 seek to analyse and show which sub-cities consistently scored higher or lower 
than the others. They show which areas within Addis Ababa have better overall resilience, and which 
ones have lower based on how they ranked on average. These results may be useful to identify sectors 
within the city requiring increased effort and investments for enhancing earthquake resilience. 
 
Based on this information, it was seen that Arada sub-city was always in the top 5. Lideta and Akaki 
Kaliti appeared 5 out of 6 times in the top 5, and these two sub-cities always scored the highest. These 
three sub-cities give the impression that they are the most resilient amongst the others. Further 
investigation by the local authorities is recommended to be carried out to understand if this is the case 
on the ground and if it is, how these sub-cities can be used as examples to replicate their success to 
underperforming sub-cities. 
 
Bole sub-city consistently scored the lowest and was always in the bottom 5. Yeka and Addis Kema 
appeared 5 out of 6 times in the bottom 5, and Nefas Sikili appeared 4 out of 6 times in the bottom 5. 
These four sub cities are considered to be the least resilient based on the information gathered. It is 
recommended as well to see the real situation within these communities and find out why this may be 
the case. A comparison with the better performing sub-cities could yield useful results that can be cross-
replicated across the board.  
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The remaining sub-cities namely; Kircos, Kolife Keraniyo and Gulele appeared 3 out of 6 times on both 
the top and bottom five ranking. This result may be misunderstood as being in the average, but in fact, 
they may be less resilient and require further assistance to improve their overall resilience.  
 
As seen from the results in Table 4, there is a low level of perceived resilience within the focus groups. 
Most of the participants scored in the low category, followed by the almost none category, then the 
moderate. None of the participants scored in the high resilience category. These results show a huge 
opportunity for the city to of Addis Ababa to start pilot programs and bridge the gap in the areas that 
are lacking fundamental resilience activities.  
 
Table 4 Percentage of resilience components by ranges of the index. 
Range of indices Percentage of components 
Almost none 
0.0 - 0.1 4% 
0.1- 0.2 13% 
Low 
0.2- 0.3 23% 
0.3-0.4 26% 
0.4-0.5 23% 
Moderate 
0.6-0.7 4% 
0.7-0.8 4%  
0.8-0.9 2% 
High 
0.9-1.0 0% 
1 0% 
 
 
The actual data of the results of the resilience scorecard for Addis Ababa are shown in Table 5 and 
Figure 60. The actual values are colour coded from red (showing the lowest values recorded signifying 
lower resilience) to yellow as resilience scores improve and finally green for the highest values which 
correspond to higher resilience. These results are useful for evaluation and planning purposes as they 
show the response and the score for each question as a group average rather than per individual who 
participated. It can help shed light on the projects that could be prioritised for capacity enhancement 
for both the community and the city authorities. 
 
 
Table 5 Resilience Scorecard results for Addis Ababa. 
 
 
Theme Name 
Community 
Leaders 
Government 
officials 
Awareness and 
advocacy 
T1-Earthquake risk perception & awareness 0.31 0.45 
T1-Availability of Information on earthquakes 0.14 0.22 
T1-Information in multiple languages 0.14 0.17 
T1-Awareness and Preparedness Exercises 0.13 0.08 
T1-Participation in awareness and preparedness 
exercises 0.25 0.12 
T1-Training and capacity building programs 0.11 0.25 
Social capacity 
T2-Health and social support programs 0.45 0.40 
T2-Participation in decision-making 0.33 0.50 
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Theme Name 
Community 
Leaders 
Government 
officials 
 
T2-Social integration (economic) 0.44 0.46 
T2-Access to basic services 0.45 0.67 
T2-Basic primary education 0.67 0.65 
T2-Social integration (different ethnicities) 0.76 0.78 
T2-Interaction of government & other 
institutions   0.56 0.45 
T2-Community involvement in decision making 0.52 0.35 
T2-Programs to safeguard historic monuments 0.24 0.13 
Legal and 
Institutional 
Arrangements 
T3-Effectiveness of earthquake safety regulations 0.27 0.22 
T3-Individuals with clear DRR roles 0.52 0.55 
T3-Mechanisms for DRR (city vs. government) 0.58 0.49 
T3-Mechanisms for DRR (inter-sub city) 0.56 0.35 
T3-Mechanisms for DRR (city vs private 
enterprises) 0.52 0.42 
T3-Confidence in central government 0.54 0.25 
T3-Confidence in local government 0.52 0.23 
T3-Confidence in NGOs 0.34 0.26 
Planning, 
Regulation and 
Mainstreaming 
of risk reduction 
T4-Seismic building codes 0.23 0.25 
T4-Enforcement of seismic building codes 0.73 0.47 
T4-Availability of earthquake insurance 0.27 0.15 
T4-Funds for DRR & earthquake mitigation 0.76 0.51 
Emergency 
preparedness, 
response and 
recovery 
T5-Storage of food supplies 0.33 0.30 
T5-Centres for emergency response coordination 0.75 0.48 
T5-Emergency procedures 0.56 0.37 
T5-Funds for response and recovery 0.66 0.40 
T5-Trained personnel for response 0.37 0.22 
T5-Equipment for search, rescue and response 0.57 0.33 
T5-Plan for restoring health & sanitation services 0.31 0.26 
T5-Response plan for search and rescue 0.54 0.32 
T5-Plan for providing shelter 0.49 0.32 
T5-Security plan for victims 0.75 0.37 
T5-Business continuity plan 0.38 0.29 
T5-Plan to restore critical infrastructure  0.62 0.40 
T5-Plan for residential rebuilding and recovery 0.51 0.33 
T5-Restoration of education, culture and 
environment 0.70 0.43 
Theme Name 
Community 
Leaders 
Government 
officials 
Critical services 
and public 
infrastructure 
resilience 
T6-Assessment and reinforcement of critical 
facilities 0.78 0.42 
T6-Non-structural mitigation for health facilities 0.44 0.17 
T6-Non-structural mitigation for educational 
facilities 0.41 0.11 
T6-Structural improvements to life lines 0.35 0.21 
T6-Availability of a business continuity plan 0.23 0.08 
T6-Plans on the repair and replacement of critical 
lifelines 0.38 0.33 
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Figure 60 Government officials scores sorted from highest to lowest. 
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5 POTENTIAL ACTIVITIES FOR INCREASING RESILIENCE IN THE CITY  
 
The application of the RPS was useful to evaluate the status, current gaps, and achievements concerning 
key dimensions of resilience in Addis Ababa. Using the results reported within, it is envisioned that it will 
be possible for relevant stakeholders to discover areas of opportunity. Further efforts are needed to 
evaluate the resilience of systems within Addis Ababa, to update resilience enhancement strategies with 
the participation of public officials and community leaders, to set benchmarks for resilience 
enhancement over time, to foster communications between various levels of government, and to 
develop earthquake risk reduction strategies. A set of potential activities for increasing resilience are 
suggested in this part of the report, to contribute to the development of a long-term earthquake plan 
reduction for the city. 
 
The city of Addis Ababa is unique in that within its sub-cities, people seemed to know each other very 
well and showed a willingness to support each other during times of crises. There is the presence of 
welfare programs for contributing to the enhancement of the city’s capacity to respond to emergencies 
but not specifically for earthquake events. From what could be seen from the responses, there was 
more awareness of other hazards such as droughts and floods mainly because they had experienced 
them before and had never experienced an earthquake event.  
 
Considering the achievements of the city in risk management as well as the results of the resilience 
scorecard, this section presents, for each dimension and component, relevant topics that could be 
included in future agendas and programs of the Metropolitan System of Risk Management of Addis 
Ababa. 
 
Awareness and advocacy. To make informed decisions, earthquake risk scenarios and loss estimate that 
consider residential, critical facilities and relevant economic sectors of the city could be promoted. Such 
results could be communicated in relevant languages to the public and could be available in a system of 
information for disaster risk management. Table 6 presents additional areas of opportunity to improve 
awareness and advocacy in Addis Ababa. 
 
Table 6 Suggested topics to improve awareness and advocacy 
Name Suggested topics  
Level of awareness 
▪ Promotion of risk identification projects. 
▪ Implementation of a system of information for disaster risk of Addis Ababa. 
Information about earthquake 
safety 
▪ The correspondent dissemination of the results, looking for a better 
understanding of risk within the communities. 
Public outreach activities and 
Training and capacity building 
▪ To inform a wider audience in campaigns such as those promoted in the 
Urban Risk Reduction Program. 
 
Social capacity. Social capacity within the city may be increased by considering these results coupled 
with indicators of social vulnerability and estimates of direct losses (physical risk) to plan and manage 
the city’s earthquake risk from an integrated perspective. Areas of opportunity that may be considered 
to improve social capacity within the city are presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 Suggested topics to improve social capacity 
Name Suggested topics 
Ties and connections and 
integration between sub-
cities 
▪ Promotion of drills and emergency plans at the community/sub-city level 
and even neighbourhoods. 
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Name Suggested topics 
Access to public services 
▪ Review of the coverage and access to public services to consider existing 
limitations in the design of emergency and contingency plans to supply 
the needs of vulnerable and affected populations after an earthquake. 
Access to education 
▪ Review of the coverage and access to public education to consider such 
limitations in the design of post-earthquake emergency operations for 
productivity and livelihoods, as well as for education, culture, and 
environment. 
Participation in decision 
making 
▪ Promotion of participatory mechanisms for community leaders in 
earthquake risk management projects.  
Cultural heritage 
▪ Given the city’s huge historical value, efforts could be promoted to 
retrofit historical buildings and cultural monuments. 
 
Legal and institutional arrangement. Considering the organisation and functions of the city of Addis 
Ababa, roles and activities could be established in earthquake risk management plans for the city. Table 
8 suggests topics that could improve legal and institutional arrangements within the city. 
 
Table 8 Suggested topics to improve legal and institutional arrangements 
Name Suggested topics 
Regulation, Ordinance or 
incentives for earthquake 
safety 
▪ Communication and explanation to the public of national and local 
regulations and ordinances for disaster risk reduction. 
▪ Development of a long-term earthquake risk reduction strategy for the 
city. 
Roles of community leaders 
in disaster risk management 
and cooperation between 
Sub cities, municipality, and 
NGOs 
▪ Promotion, with the collaboration of NGOs, of participatory mechanisms 
for community leaders and development of common agendas for disaster 
risk reduction between Sub cities and the Municipality. 
▪ Evaluation of staffing needs and implementation of specialized training to 
improve staff capacity at the Metropolitan System of Risk Reduction. 
 
Planning, Regulation and mainstreaming risk reduction. Areas of opportunity that may be utilized to 
improve aspects related to planning, regulation and risk reduction within the city are presented in Table 
9. 
 
Table 9 Suggested topics to improve planning, regulation and mainstreaming risk reduction. 
Name Suggested topics 
Earthquake resistant building 
codes 
▪ Stronger control mechanisms for the implementation of the existing building 
code (EBCS-1995). 
▪ Socialization of current building code (EBCS-1995), especially among 
governmental officials. 
▪ Analysis of incentives for reinforcement or retrofitting of buildings to meet 
the requirements of the building code (EBCS-1995). 
Budget for disaster risk 
reduction 
▪ Review of budget limitations and needs for promoting risk reduction projects. 
▪ Design projects and proposals to be funded by international donors and 
organizations. 
▪ Clear communication to the population of budget limitations as well as the 
criteria and procedures used for prioritizing interventions. 
Availability and use of 
insurance 
▪ Review and analysis of insurance regulations, household capacities and 
insurance mechanisms for public infrastructure and residential buildings. 
 
Emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. Suggested topics to improve aspects related to 
planning, regulation and risk reduction within the city are listed in Table 10. 
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Table 10 Suggested topics to improve emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. 
Name Suggested topics 
Standard operational 
procedures for coordinating 
emergency rescue and 
response activities 
▪ Establishment of training programs for members of the community on first 
response, first aid and light search and rescue (SAR). 
▪ Establishment of training programs for relevant institutions, such as FEPRA, 
Civil Protection, Red Cross and Police, on medium and heavy search and 
rescue (SAR). 
▪ Establishment of training programs for engineers, architects (both 
professionals and students) on building safety assessment after earthquakes.  
▪ Formulation of a post-event building safety assessment plan to determine 
efficiently the occupancy feasibility of damaged buildings.  
▪ Establishment of training programs on damage assessment and needs analysis 
(DANA). 
▪ Dissemination and communication of existing operational procedures or 
protocols for emergency response.  
▪ Implementation of existing operational procedures or protocols through 
simulation and drills with the participation of all relevant institutions, such as 
FEPRA, Civil Protection, Red Cross and Police and the community. 
Local centres for 
implementing and 
coordinating emergencies 
▪ The prevention and preparedness committee needs physical headquarters 
easily identified by the community and equally distributed around the city, 
either with similar service areas (response areas) or with smaller service areas 
in high-vulnerability zones of the city. 
▪ Implementation of public outreach activities to inform about the local centres 
for emergency coordination. 
Funds for emergency 
response and recovery 
▪ Estimation of the potential costs and financial needs for emergency response 
and identification of potential funding sources. 
▪ Promotion of affordable, effective insurance mechanisms. 
▪ Establishment of an emergency response and recovery fund to cover the 
needs of Addis Ababa in case of an earthquake 
Resources for emergency 
response and recovery 
▪ Establishment of an information system of resources for emergency response. 
▪ Evaluation of the city’s response capacity by comparing current inventories 
with estimates of potential damages.  
▪ Development of a pre-disaster shelter program to attend people left by an 
earthquake.  
Contingency plans 
▪ Delineation of evidence-based contingency plans for earthquakes. 
▪ Public outreach activities to inform about contingency plans and their 
implementation. 
▪ Implementation of simulations and drills with communities to test, socialize 
and improve available contingency plans. 
 
 
Critical services and public infrastructure resilience. Areas for the improvement of critical services and 
public infrastructure resilience within the city are described in Table 11. 
 
Table 11 Suggested topics to improve emergency preparedness, response and recovery 
Name Suggested topics 
Assessment and retrofitting 
of critical facilities and 
reduction of non-structural 
vulnerabilities 
▪ Assessment of physical vulnerability of health and educational facilities. 
▪ Strengthening and retrofitting of health and educational facilities. 
▪ Assessment of the vulnerability and potential losses of lifelines and 
implementation of mitigation actions. 
 
Contingency/Emergency 
response plans and Business 
▪ Formulation and implementation of emergency response plans for schools 
and health facilities. 
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Name Suggested topics 
Assessment and retrofitting 
of critical facilities and 
reduction of non-structural 
vulnerabilities 
▪ Assessment of physical vulnerability of health and educational facilities. 
▪ Strengthening and retrofitting of health and educational facilities. 
▪ Assessment of the vulnerability and potential losses of lifelines and 
implementation of mitigation actions. 
 
continuity plans for lifelines ▪ Formulation of pre-disaster contingency and recovery plans. 
▪ Formulation and implementation of Business Continuity Plans (BCP) plan for 
lifelines.  
▪ Simulations and drills to review and adjust BCP. 
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APPENDIX 
Scores by resilience dimensions 
Minimum, maximum and average values of the scores were obtained from each of the questions and 
are presented in this section. This analysis is useful to identify components requiring more efforts to 
improve the resilience to earthquakes in Addis Ababa. It also outlines the differences in the scores 
obtained from community leaders and representatives of the city’s government/public officials. 
 
Awareness and advocacy 
Scores obtained from each of the questions within this dimension are shown below in Figure A1. The 
government/public officials scored higher. It can be noted as well that the lowest score in this 
dimension was related to the question of the existence of awareness and preparedness exercises.  
  
Lowest score Existence of awareness and preparedness exercises. 
 
Highest score Earthquake risk perception and awareness. 
 
Score 
differences 
between 
groups 
Scores given by public officials are higher than those given by the community 
representatives. 
 
 
 
A 1 Awareness and advocacy. 
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Social Capital 
Overall, this dimension as can be seen from Figure A2 had the highest scores from both sets of groups. It 
is clear that the city officials have done a lot to support the community and the community recognizes 
the efforts that were put forward.  
Lowest score Programs to safe guard historic monuments. 
 
Highest score Social Integration of different ethnicities. 
 
Score 
differences 
between 
groups 
Average scores given from the community were higher than those from the public 
officials. However, both groups scored in the high range. 
 
 
 
 A 2 Social Capital. 
 
 
Legal and institutional arrangements 
This dimension had high scores, more so from the community participants as seen in Figure A3. It could 
be construed that most of the participants were not aware if there were effective earthquake 
regulations. Nevertheless, there was high confidence in both the local and central governments, but so 
much for the NGOs.  
 
Lowest score Effectiveness earthquake safety regulations. 
 
Highest score Individuals with clear DRR roles. 
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Score 
differences 
between 
groups 
Scores given by public officials are higher than those given by the community 
representatives. 
 
 
A 3 Legal and institutional arrangements. 
 
 
 
Planning regulation and mainstreaming risk reduction 
This dimension was well understood, and the results in Figure A4 show the community and the public 
officials scoring similarly although with varied values, with community always giving much higher scores. 
It is interesting to note that both groups view that there is a lack of building codes but consider that the 
enforcement is high. It may reflect that if codes existed, the city is willing to ensure their enforcement. 
 
Lowest score Availability of earthquake insurance. 
 
Highest score Funds for DRR and earthquake mitigation 
 
Score 
differences 
between 
groups 
Scores given by public officials are lower than those given by the community 
representatives, showing more conservativeness and might be due to them having 
more knowledge on the matter. 
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A 4 Planning regulation and mainstreaming risk reduction. 
 
Emergency preparedness, response and recovery 
This dimension had the most questions and sought to exhaust all possible topics within this vast area of 
disaster management as noted in Figure A5. Areas that might need more attention include training of 
personnel for disaster response, having/improving on plans for search and rescue and provision of 
temporary shelter immediately following a disaster event. 
 
 
Lowest score Plan for restoring health and sanitation services. 
 
Highest score Centres for emergency response coordination. 
 
Score 
differences 
between 
groups 
Scores given by public officials are more reserved and lower than those given by the 
community representatives. They, however, follow the same general pattern of 
mimicking each other although with different score values. 
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A 5 Emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. 
 
 
Critical services and public infrastructure resilience 
About this dimension, Figure A6 shows the need to concentrate more on the creation or updating of the 
business continuity plan. Other areas that may require attention are the overall mitigation measures for 
educational, health and critical lifelines.  
 
 
Lowest score Availability of a business continuity plan. 
 
Highest score Assessment and reinforcement of critical facilities. 
 
Score 
differences 
between 
groups 
Scores given by public officials were much lower than those given by the community 
representatives.  
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A 6 Critical services and public infrastructure resilience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
